The East African (Nairobi)

April 11, 2006
Posted to the web April 11, 2006

Fred Oluoch
Nairobi

Sudan's historic peace agreement may collapse if the principle parties do not move fast to start implementing specific aspects of the deal, a study by the International Crisis Group (ICG) has concluded.

ICG, an international not-for- profit-body, has stationed analysts in both Khartoum and Juba to monitor the situation in the country.

The report attributes the delays in the implementation of the peace deal to the death last July of former vice-president, John Garang, which it says has not only allowed Khartoum to procrastinate but also seriously weakened the bargaining capacity of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM).

The report decries the fact that the international community, which played a crucial role in the success of the peace deal, is merely watching as the situation deteriorates. It says that the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) has the capacity to implement the peace deal but lacks the political will, whereas the SPLM has the commitment but is weak and disorganised.

"There is a real risk of renewed conflict down the road unless the NCP begins to implement the CPA in good faith, and the SPLM becomes a stronger and more effective implementing partner," says the report.

The report accuses Khartoum of striving to hold on to power by selectively implementing elements of the peace deal without allowing for any fundamental change in the way the country is governed.

It says that without a functioning and effective SPLM, there is little chance that the the peace deal will hold.

The report also says that the ongoing conflict in Darfur has distracted both international attention and the parties from the peace deal.

Despite the formation of the government of national unity last year, several key commissions and committees and other bodies which were supposed to implement the agreement are yet to be established.

They include the Human Rights Commission, the Land Commission, the National Electoral Commission, the Commission on the Rights of non-Muslims in the National Capital and the National Civil Service Commission.

The report says that delays in establishing the civil service commission means that there has not yet been any SPLM integration into the national institutions or civil service, beyond those appointed to ministerial or state ministerial positions.

While many of these bodies have been created by presidential decree, the legality of some of them is questionable, whereas most of those legally established are not yet functional.

The report says that tensions had emerged over the management of oil resources especially after the SPLM lost their bargain for the Ministry of Energy that manages the petroleum sector. Apparently, Garang had bargained to have the ministry controlled by the SPLM.

The report says that Khartoum refused to heed the pleas by his successor Salva Kiir to have the docket headed by SPLM. Khartoum's position was that southerners were going to vote for separation irrespective of whether they had the ministry.

Kiir and the SPLM, according to the report, ultimately backed down from their demand for the ministry, anticipating that the National Petroleum Commission (NCP) would still provide the SPLM with a direct role in overseeing the petroleum sector.

Apart from the decision causing disappointment among southerners, many of whom blamed Kiir for giving up where Garang would have succeeded, the SPLM does not yet have access to any of the information relating to oil production figures and existing contracts.

Thus, the main revenue stream of the Government of the South (GOSS) remains at the mercy of Khartoum.

For 2005, Khartoum maintains that the share for the South was $798.4 million, of which it spent $194.5 million on administrative costs for the now defunct South Sudan Co-ordinating Council from January 9 to July 9. The GOSS received $523.3 of the remaining $603.9 million.

In late January, Kiir publicly complained that the GOSS was not receiving its rightful share of the oil revenue. The wealth sharing agreement in the peace deal stated that all existing oil agreements would remain valid, thereby further undermining the right of the SPLM to have signed these agreements. As a result, the oil sector continues to be a high-risk area for conflict.

Under the terms of the peace deal, the GOSS is to receive 50 per cent of all revenue from oil produced in southern Sudan, after two per cent is set aside for the relevant oil producing state government.

However, the parties have not yet agreed on the parameters for calculating the oil wealth, or which oil fields lie in the South.

: Peace Agreement May Collapse, Warns Crisis Group (Page 2 of 2)

There has not yet been any progress on ascertaining the North-South borders, which will determine the division of the oilfields. Though the peace deal granted a small SPLM technical team the right to see and review existing oil contracts, this has not yet happened.

In the meantime, the much needed help from the international community has been slow in pushing for the honouring of various aspects and the much needed financial assistance. As the driving force behind the peace agreement, the United States was expected to contribute the most money towards implementation. At Oslo, the US pledged $1.7 billion for fiscal years 2005 and 2006, but some US officials, according to the report, argue that the complexities of various bilateral sanctions against Sudan for its sponsorship of terrorist activity and abysmal human rights record have restricted the US ability to support the CPA.

The critical issue is how to apply sanctions against the "Government of Sudan" when there is now a Government of National Unity and a Government of Southern Sudan. US sanctions are also slowing the dispensing of $421.9 million pledged for 2006 and 2007 by donors to Multi Donor Trust Funds (MTDFs), which are managed by the World Bank.

The World Bank has approved projects worth approximately $150 million, but project implementation has been slowed because the bank needs a license from the US Office of Foreign Assets Control to conduct some transactions related to MTDF projects.

State Department officials believe that the situation will be remedied, but ambiguities within US regulations have created bureaucratic delays that further hinder the international community's ability to deliver on its promises.

Garang's death has also had a negative impact on the interest and involvement of some Western and African countries in following the implementation process. Garang was an expert at engaging with the international community, using his allies in the US, Europe and Africa as "force multipliers" to increase pressure on Khartoum during the negotiation process.

The impact of Garang's death was also felt in international circles, where some appear to have concluded that the agreement had died with him.

Still, the other threat to the deal is the delay in disengagement of forces, disarmament and demobilisation processes. Redeployment of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) from the South and the SPLA from the North are far behind schedule.

Though SAF maintains it is within the timetable established in the CPA for withdrawals - having already removed 13,334 of its 66,525 troops in the South - the SPLA argues that SAF is reinforcing its positions in Renk and Melut.

The report concludes that the unstable partnership between a strong but unwilling Khartoum government and a weak but committed SPLM is making the implementation process highly volatile.

With conflicts still raging in Darfur and simmering in the East, the peace deal does not yet appear to be the comprehensive answer to Sudan's problems.